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a b s t r a c t
The Apple iPad is a popular tablet device presented by Apple in early 2010. The
idiosyncracies of this new portable device and the kind of data it may store open new
opportunities in the field of computer forensics. Given that its design, both internal and
external, is very similar to the iPhone, the current easiest way to obtain a forensic image is
to install an SSH server and some tools, dump its internal storage and transfer it to a remote
host via wireless networking. This approach may require up to 20 hours. In this paper, we
present a novel approach that takes advantage of an undocumented feature so that it is
possible to use a cheap iPad accessory, the Camera Connection Kit, to image the disk to an
external hard drive attached via USB connection, greatly reducing the required time.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Portable devices have become a very important technology in society, allowing access to computing resources or services
in an ubiquitousmanner. In this regard, mobile phones have become the clear spearhead, undergoing a great transformation
in recent years, slowly becoming small computers that can be conveniently carried in our pockets and managed with
one hand. However, as user requirements started to include new functionalities beyond those that a mobile phone can
realistically offer, advanced portable devices have been developed in order to fulfill them. Such devices try to reach a
compromise between a high degree of portability, usability and the ability to provide such advanced functionalities (for
example, being able to read or process documents).
One of the top devices in the field of embedded portable devices is the Apple iPad, a tablet computer which tries to take
advantage of the success of its ancestor, the iPhone. It was announced by Apple in January 2010 and launched in the USA and
Europe between April and May 2010. After 80 days in the market, 3 million units had been sold [1]. Given its popularity, it
becomes evident that as such devices become widespread, they will also become more common and relevant as sources of
evidence froma computer forensic standpoint, providing data about their users. This kind of data can become very important
in cases of criminal investigation, where it can be used as evidence in court or provide valuable clues to investigators. Since
advanced portable devices are usually closed embedded systems with their own idiosyncracies, not actually being full-
fledged PCs, forensic data acquisition presents some interesting challenges. This is especially relevant when it is necessary
to use non-invasive methods, maintaining the device in the same state (or as similar as possible) as the one it was in before
the analysis began.
Currently, the easiest method to obtain a forensic image of an iPad device (which can also basically be applied to an
iPhone) is to install an SSH server and some tools, retrieve its internal storage contents and transfer the data to a remote
host via wireless networking. Unfortunately, this is very slow, and can take up to 20 h.More efficientmethods exist, but they
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Fig. 1. iPad button configuration (iOS 4 and higher).
are based on closed software, which relies on obscure or undisclosed techniques and is very dependent on the iOS version.
As soon as an iOS upgrade becomes available, they can no longer be used until a new version is created.
In this paper, we propose a versatile approach which reaches a compromise between forensic data acquistion speed and
an open approach, without the need of vendor specific software or a dependency on a very specific iOS version. Achieved
with the help of a cheap and easily available peripheral, the Camera Connection Kit, it is possible to generate a forensic
image using an USB connection. Furthermore, this approach still minimizes the amount of data which is modified during
the acquisition process.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the iPad architecture, focusing on those
characteristics especially relevant from a forensic analysis standpoint. In Section 3, a literature review of the current state
of iPhone/iPad forensic imaging techniques is presented. The proposed forensic data acquisition method is described in
Section 4. Section 5 provides a brief discussion aboutwhich forensic techniques can be applied on the image generated using
our method, and, in Section 6, an analysis of its performance is presented. Concluding the paper, Section 7 summarizes the
paper’s contributions and outlines further work.
2. iPad architecture overview
From the external point of view, the iPad is basically a big (24×19 cm.) iPhone with a 9.7′′ screen, providing a resolution
of 1024× 768. While its internals are very similar to those of its ancestor, the iPad’s larger form factor makes it suitable for
longer periods of use, which has motivated the appearance of many different applications of all kinds. Therefore, the iPad is
able to perform tasks previously reserved for common computers or, up to some point, netbooks.
2.1. Main features
The basic iPad internals are:
• Processor: A custom Apple A4 ARM processor based on a single-core Cortex-A8, running at 1 GHz.
• Volatile storage: 256 MB DRAM.
• Non-volatile storage: 16, 32 or 64 GB solid state storage drive.
• Wireless connectivity: 802.11 a/b/g/n and Bluetooth 2.1, the same as every iPhone.
• In addition, the 3G model features an A-GPS (Assisted GPS), and hardware for communicating over UMTS/HSDPA (820,
1900 and 2100 MHz) and GSM/EDGE (850, 900, 1800 and 1900 MHz).
A second generation hit the market in March 2011, featuring a dual-core Apple A5 processor and 512 MB of RAM.
2.2. Connectors and buttons
The iPad connectors and buttons are very similar to the iPhone’s. When placed over the short edgewith the round button
in the center, we find:
• Top left: a 3.5′′ jack capable of functioning simultaneously for several audio functionalities.
• Top right: ‘‘Lock’’ button.
• Right edge, near the top: volume controls, and one configurable switch which can either mute the device, or lock the
screen orientation.
• Bottom center, front face: round ‘‘Home’’ button.
• Bottom center, in the edge (below the ‘‘Home’’ button): Apple standard 30-pin ‘‘Dock’’ connector, the same as used in
every iPhone and most iPods. This is also the port used when referring to the iPhone or iPad’s ‘serial port’.
Fig. 1 shows the function of each button. Note that the ‘‘Lock’’ button performs several functions: when the device is
off, it will turn it on; when the device is on, a short press will put the device to sleep or wake it from sleep and a long
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press will show a dialog to turn it off. For clarity, in this paper we will refer to this button as the ‘‘Lock’’ button. The button
configuration is important since, as will be explained in Section 4.1.1, it may be necessary to put the device in DFU mode
(‘Download Firmware Update’) in order to setup the device for forensic imaging. When this is needed, installed software
usually instructs the user to press a particular combination of these buttons to have the device enter DFU mode.
2.3. Partition scheme
As noted by Zdziarski [2], all devices belonging to the iPhone family contain two partitions:
(1) A huge user data partition, holding all extra installed applications as well as all the user’s data.
(2) A small system partition containing iOS and the basic applications.
From a forensic standpoint, as far as the user data partition is concerned, some iPad applications that may hold relevant
data include enterprise or office software, such as QuickOffice Connect Mobile Suite [3] or Apple’s iWork suite [4]. They
can all contain text documents or spreadsheets, which are prone to including sensitive or financial information. Although
similar applications existed in the iPhone, allowing for direct document editing without the need for an external computer,
the iPad’s form factor will no doubt boost the existence of documents stored solely within the device (and not, for instance,
in the suspect’s main computer), being edited here and nevermoving beyond the iPad (with the possible exception of device
backups performed by iTunes).
Another possible source of information lies within Apple’s AirPrint framework, released in November 2010 as a feature of
iOS 4.2 [5], which provides native printing capabilities to the iPhone and iPad. However, long before AirPrint existed, other
applications, such as PrintCentral [6], already allowed the user to sendmost document types to a remote printer (connected
to a computer with the appropriate server software). These applications’ disk caches are likely to hold relevant information,
such as copies of printed documents.
The systempartition contains the base iOS software that comes bundled inside every iOS software update (which explains
why they require hundreds of megabytes). This includes the core operating system and graphical user interface, as well as
the standard set of bundled applications such as: Safari, Mail, Calendar, iPod, etc. Note that only the application binaries
themselves lie within this partition, whereas the relevant data (for instance, user mail) is stored in the data partition.
3. Current work on iPad forensics
A very basic approach to acquiring user data is to connect the device via the standard USB cable to a computer running
iTunes, Apple’s multimedia player, which is in charge of synchronizing content to the device. Using its AFC protocol (Apple
File Connect), iTunes syncs existing information (contacts, calendar, email accounts, apps. . . ) and can even retrieve a complete
backup of the device; however this presents two problems:
(1) The device needs to be correctly paired with the iTunes software in order to sync.
(2) Even if the investigator has access to an iTunes backup of the device (say, found in the suspect’s main computer), it will
not contain unallocated space, from which deleted data can be recovered.
Consequently, more sophisticated methods are required. However, the iPad is distributed as a closed device, meaning
that access to its internals is limited and only applications approved by Apple may be installed or executed. With this set of
restrictions in place, it is extremely difficult to acquire any kind of meaningful forensic data. Fortunately, even though the
iPad is a very new device, its internal architecture is very similar to the iPhone and forensic approachesmay be easily ported
to the iPad.
On July 6th 2007, just one week after the iPhone was launched, George Hotz announced [7] the existence of a method
to provide a full, interactive shell. This was the first step towards bypassing Apple’s restrictions on their devices, making
it possible to execute any program and not only those approved by Apple; a process that has been named jailbreaking. In
other mobile platforms, such as those running Google’s Android operating system, a similar process exists, known as rooting.
Vendors usually disapprove of this technique, although in most countries it is legal or at least not definitely illegal. If you
ever need to defend this practice in court, you can give a brief explanation of why you are jailbreaking the device: to get
full access to the system, and thus to the information stored in it, which is crucial in criminal cases which require forensic
analysis of these kind of devices.
The jailbreaking process modifies the system partition without altering the data partition, which means that it does not
alter the user’s data, a very important requisite. Even if we assume that some current or future jailbreaking methods will
modify the user data partition, we can still obtain plenty of useful information, as long as we know what alterations we are
responsible for. Ever since their development, the jailbreaking tools have been updated to support every new iPhone model
and every new iOS version. This method may also be applied to an iPad and, in fact, the two major forensic approaches to
recovering a complete image from the device are ultimately based on jailbreaking.
The main approach was proposed by Zdziarski [2], who noted that the iPhone can communicate across several different
media, including the serial port, 802.11 Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth. Due to the limitations of Bluetooth on the iPhone, the two
preferred methods are via the serial port and Wi-Fi. He proposed a basic method for obtaining a forensic image of the iPhone,
without tampering with the user data partition, by jailbreaking the device and using SSH access and the dd and netcat
standard UNIX tools, which by that time had already been ported as a part of the growing iPhone jailbreaking community.
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Similar methods are explored by Rabaiotti [8] against a Microsoft Xbox. There was not, however, a known, public way to
communicate with the device via its serial port, so Zdziarski had to send the forensic image via the device Wi-Fi interface,
which is quite slow.
Alternate approaches are provided by some forensics software vendors [9,10], who have developed solutions that use
rather uncommon techniques to get a dump of the solid state storage drive. This is often accomplished by using exploits
againstmore or less known bugs in specific iOS versions in order to execute arbitrary unapproved code, which is actually the
same as jailbreakers do in order to free their devices. However, these vendors do not need to install a complete set of tools in
the device. Instead, they tend to upload a tiny, small-footprint software agent which will ideally take control of the system,
dump the solid state storage drive through the serial port (dock connector), and then reboot the device without copying
any data to the iPad internal storage. This method offers some advantages over the jailbreaking approach, being a more
straightforward process, simpler for the investigator and leaving little or no footprint on the acquired system. However, it
also has some weak points.
First and foremost, any proprietary method ultimately makes use of an exploit against the vulnerabilities of the iOS
version of the device, because this is the only way to take such control of the device, bypassing every vendor restriction.
With every iOS update (usually every fewmonths, downloaded via iTunes), the forensics software must be updated, usually
because bugs exploited in previous versions are fixed in the newer version; but even if an exploit still works, exploitation
parameters such as memory addresses are very likely to change.
Jansen [11] identified ‘‘the latency in coverage of newly available phone models by forensic tools’’ as one of the problems
for forensic specialists working with mobile devices. Jailbreaking in the iPad has been moving in a timeframe of barely 1–5
days following iOS updates. We consider it very realistic that at some point in the near future, jailbreak updates will be
available days or even weeks before some particular forensics software products get the same needed updates. Therefore,
even though some of the proprietary methods may be suitable for the analysis of the device under common circumstances,
vendors of such products may fail to release an update in time to support newer iOS versions; they may even not release it
at all if, say, the product is discontinued.
In addition,many of these proprietarymethods are closed and lack any public documentation. Therefore, they are difficult
to audit and it cannot be guaranteed that no footprint is actually left on the device. Knowing the process the device is going
through, and the precise alterations that this process causes to the device, is good practice and very important to the forensic
investigator.
4. Versatile forensic data acquisition
In this section we will describe the proposed method for iPad imaging via the Camera Connection Kit through the USB
connection. Themethod is divided into two general phases: device setup and imaging. Each phase is also divided into several
substeps which must be sequentially followed.
4.1. Device setup
This phase encompasses all the necessary steps to leave the device open and ready for forensic image acquisition. As
mentioned in Section 3, before any forensic analysis may be attempted, a special device setup is required in order to bypass
the access restrictions installed by the manufacturer. Once this phase is complete, low-level access to the device is actually
possible. In addition, it is necessary to install the extra packages needed for our proposed imaging approach.
4.1.1. Jailbreak the device
The only requisite in order to apply ourmethod is startingwith a jailbroken iPad.Wewill not provide detailed instructions
about how to jailbreak an iPad, just the basic guidelines. Once this prerequisite is met, our method can be applied on any
iPad, iOS version notwithstanding. This is in contrast with vendor specific tools, as explained in Section 3.
The actual way to perform jailbreaking varies depending on the iOS version installed on the device. An iPad running iOS
3.2.1 can be jailbroken just by browsing the website http://www.jailbreakme.com, which exploits a known vulnerability in
Safari to take control of the system. The exploits themselves and related documentation can be found at [12]. For a complete,
up-to-date chart about jailbreaking tools for each iOS version, refer to [13].
Should we find a device with a recent iOS version for which no jailbreak procedure exists, it could be acceptable to
downgrade to the latest jailbreakable version, although this should be done only as a last resort, and always documenting
the steps taken. This rarely succeeds, however, because Apple does not allow one to downgrade a device’s iOS version after a
newer version has been available for some time. There are some workarounds for this but they are of no use in our scenario
because they require that we have previously saved some crucial data before installing the present iOS version. Anyway, it
is very unlikely that we will hit a non-jailbreakable iOS. Take, for instance, iOS 4.2.1 (the first iOS 4 release for the iPad): it
was released on November 22 2010, and the appropriate tool for jailbreaking (in that case redsn0w) was released the next
day [14]. Similar time windows apply for the different 4.3.x iOS versions released during the first months of 2011.
Once a new iOS version has been released, the first jailbreaking methods will probably be tethered: a tethered jailbreak
means that it is only effective as long as the operating system is running. The moment it is rebooted (not when the device
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is locked), the jailbreak is lost, meaning that two things will happen temporarily until the device is rebooted again into a
tethered jailbreak state with the appropriate tool: (1) any jailbreak software installed will not work; and (2) some internal
applications (for instance the Safari web browser) may not work, or in the worst case, the whole device might not work at
all. We state again that this is only a temporary state, until the device is jailbroken again. It would be acceptable to use a
tethered jailbreak for imaging purposes, and in fact part of the tests performed in this paper have taken place on an iPad
with a tethered jailbreak.
Many jailbreaking tools (redsn0w, PwnageTool, etc.) will require the user to put the device into DFU mode with a
combination of presses of the ‘‘Lock’’ and ‘‘Home’’ buttons.When this is needed, the softwarewill give the user the necessary
instructions.
It also is important to note that jailbreaking a device does not mean carrier unlocking it. Jailbreak is just a precondition for
carrier unlocking. Our proposal need not perform carrier unlocking, and in fact this is rarely needed in the iPad given that it
is usually sold carrier-free.
4.1.2. Install required software packages
After the device has been jailbroken, a new application labeled Cydia [15] appears in the home screen. In the case that
this application already exists, the previous setup is not necessary. This is the software manager that allows the installation
of software not approved by Apple.
When run for the first time, Cydia initializes the device’s filesystem and exits. In the next execution, it presents a Who
are you? prompt, offering three choices; ‘Developer (no filters)’ must be chosen, as it offers the widest range of software.
Afterwards, if there are available updates to install, it is recommended to perform a ‘Complete upgrade’. The devicewill then
restart. It is necessary to re-open Cydia and, if asked for upgrades, repeat the process.
Once Cydia has finished upgrading itself, using the ‘Search’ function, the following packages are installed:
• openssh. This package contains the SSH server that will be used to access the device.
• coreutils. This package contains the split command, which is needed due to reasons that will be explained later.
The most important tool for this procedure, dd, need not be installed, as it is contained inside the essential coreutils-bin
package, which is installed by default as part of the jailbreaking process.
4.1.3. Network and auto-lock settings
It is necessary to connect the device to a wireless network, since during the process it will be remotely accessed from
another computer. This connection is necessary to issue commands, but not for the actual image data transfer. If no wireless
network is available, a laptop can be used to create an ad-hoc network and have the iPad join it.
Communication between the computer and the iPadwill be over SSH, and thus, encrypted. However, it is strongly advised
to use encryption in the wireless network protocol, and ideally, to use an isolated network for the computer and the iPad
only. The main reason for this is the fact that there is a small window of time during which the device will be accessible
with default passwords. There is at least one known worm which penetrates jailbroken iOS devices using these default
credentials [16], although nowadays it is almost impossible to find that code in the wild.
Once the connection has been established, the iPad ‘Settings’ application reveals the IP address in use (usually acquired
via DHCP) and allows the user to manually specify an IP address if needed. The IP address must be noted down, as it will be
needed later for accessing the iPad from the remote computer.
Still in the ‘Settings’ application, the ‘Auto-Lock’ option must be set to ‘Never’. This will prevent the device from going
into sleepmode while the forensic image is being generated, which could interrupt the process. When not in use, the device
should be locked (using the Lock button; see Section 2) in order to save battery.
We have not tested whether the multitasking capabilities and persistent Wi-Fi in iOS 4 would allow the imaging process
to take place while the device is locked. Anyway, given that imaging is a process that can take a long time in devices with
the largest local drives, it is recommended to keep the device awake all the time.
Local access approach
We would like to note that, even though the best way to apply our proposal is by issuing commands via SSH, we
experimented and also found at least two ways to apply the imaging method without actually using a remote computer.
However, both of them introduce additional complications to the process.
On one hand, it may be possible to installMobileTerminal instead of openssh, and use the terminal application in the iPad
itself to mount the hard drive and image to it. However, at the time of writing,MobileTerminal does not work in iOS versions
4.x, and this software has a history of long delays before being updated to support newer iOS versions.
On the other hand, another approach is to install openssh and run an SSH client on the iPad itself. There are many such
applications in Apple’s App Store, although keeping this application running during the image generation is likely to alter
data and will possibly corrupt the image. Thus, it is preferable to use a remote computer and leave the iPad as untouched as
possible. Setting the user data partition read-only is not a possible solution in this case, as will be explained in Section 4.2.1.
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Fig. 2. iPad connection to an external hard drive via Camera Connection Kit.
4.2. Device imaging
Before the process can actually begin, it is necessary to have the battery charged to, at least, about 20%. This is because,
during the imaging process, the iPad’s dock connector will be used for USB data transfer, so it will not be possible to plug
the device to a power point.
With the device connected to a wireless network, another computer is used to establish an SSH session with the iPad. At
this point, the device is accessible via the standard password alpine, which works for both the standard mobile user as
well as for the root user, which has full access to the device. The correct way to proceedwould be to access the iPad via SSH
as the root user, and immediately change its password and the password of the mobile user account, using the passwd
command.
4.2.1. Mounting a USB hard drive
In this step, the Apple peripheral, Camera Connection Kit [17], is used in order to access an external USB hard drive.
According to Apple, ‘‘the iPad Camera Connection Kit gives you two ways to import photos and videos from a digital camera:
using your camera’s USB cable or directly from an SD card’’ [17]. Thus, it consists of two adapters, one of them being an SD card
reader and the other offering a USB female connector; both of these adapters can plug (one at a time) into the iPad’s dock
connector, located in the base, below the ‘‘Home’’ button.
Initial vendor information suggested that the USB adapter only uses the PTP [18] protocol to access the images stored in
a camera, and that an actual camera, with its camera-to-USB cable, should be plugged into this connector for the adapter
to import the pictures. This is the normal use for this adapter, and is what Apple advertises it for. When this is done, the
Photo application launches and allows the user to transfer photos and videos from the connectedmedia to the iPad’s internal
memory.
Our results show that iOS implements the much wider USB mass storage device class protocol, of which PTP is a subset.
PTP allows basic operations on the items of a video device, usually a photo camera, in which FAT-formatted media store the
files under the /DCIM directory [19]). Instead, the iPad can mount and make full use of FAT and HFS filesystems.
The device just emulates the behavior of PTP: it automatically mounts FAT drives looking for the /DCIM. If this folder
exists, the Photo application will open, allowing the user to import contents; if it does not exist, the device is unmounted
and ignored. In our approach, we exploit this undocumented feature to manually mount an external USB hard drive with
the appropriate parameters, and use it to obtain an image of the iPad internal storage.
After connecting theUSB external drive to the iPad (see Fig. 2),we can check its presencewithin the SSH session by looking
for the /dev/disk1 device. The iPad internal storage disk is assigned the device name /dev/disk0, so the presence of
such a device implies that the newly connected hard drive has been correctly recognized.
Should no /dev/disk1 device exist, the drive has not been recognized. In our tests, this was usually accompanied by a
dialog in the screen complaining that ‘‘this device requires toomuch power’’, when trying to connect certain large solid state
storage drives and some portable hard drives that take power from USB only. Under iOS version 4 it is more problematic,
since the USB port will no longer emit 100mA (as it did under iOS 3.x) but only about 20mA [20]. Therefore, in our tests, we
found that the best results were achieved using a full-size external hard drive with its own power adapter, or connecting
the drive to a powered USB hub.
As for the supported filesystems,wehave been successful inmounting FAT andHFS+ (the standardMacintosh filesystem,
which is also the one used for the iPad internal storage). Due to theMacintosh EFI support, finding the correct partition name
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for disks with EFI partitioning can be tricky. It is not always named /dev/disk1. In that scenario, we found it is necessary
to list all the extra available disk devices and mount them, one at a time, until one is successful.
An important issue for Windows users is that their operating system will refuse to format a drive larger than 32 GB as
FAT [21], although it can normally mount much bigger FAT partitions and work with them flawlessly. These users will need
to use externals tools such as Fat32Format [22]. Mac and Linux users will have no trouble with their standard Disk Utility
andmkfs.msdos tools, respectively.
Zdziarski [2] recommended immediately remounting the data partition in read-only mode prior to beginning the actual
imaging. However, in our tests, we found that in both iOS 3 and iOS 4 the system halted if the partition was unmounted.
Forcing its remount was not supported either. It must also be noted that imaging amounted partitionmay alter the integrity
of the filesystem contained in the resulting image. In fact we found out that it is possible to end up with images that are
unmountable. In order to reduce this risk, no other activity should take place in the iPad (either via the touch screen or
through the network) while imaging.
Considering all the above, the best option is to use a drive with traditional MBR partitioning scheme, containing only a
HFS+ partition. Once the disk has been mounted, it is possible to assess its free space and confirm that the drive has been
correctly recognized.
4.2.2. Obtaining the forensic image
At this point, the actual imaging process may be started by invoking the Unix low-level copying and raw data conversion
dd command, as listed in the following line. The resulting data is dumped to the newly mounted filesystem via the USB
connection.
# dd if=/dev/rdisk0s2s1 of=/mnt/ipad.dd bs=512k
If the target drive is FAT32-formatted, the maximum file size it can hold will be 4 GB. This means that images will need
to be split into 4 GB blocks. In the recommended scenario (imaging to HFS+ drives), this is not necessary.
When finished, the target drive must be unmounted before disconnecting it from the iPad. This can be done by either
turning the iPad off or unmounting the drive by exiting the /mnt folder and running the Unix umount command.
If the device is passcode-protected, jailbreaking and accessing via SSH is equally possible. The simplest jailbreaking
methods from a user standpoint, such as jailbreakme.com, will not work given that we are unable to obtain initial access
to the device, but other methods (redsn0w, Pwnage Tool. . . ) may work.
5. Discussion on image analysis
Using our proposed open method, it is possible to obtain the data stored in the user partition in a manner that can be
readily accessed using forensic tools and techniques. This method can be automatically applied to new iOS versions as soon
as a jailbreak is available for them, even if it is just a tethered jailbreak.
In this section, we provide a brief discussion about how the resulting image can be processed and what kinds of data can
be obtained from our image, highlighting some important issues in more recent iOS revisions in that regard.
5.1. Obtainable data using forensic tools
Raw images obtained by our method can be treated in many ways. For instance:
• SQLite databases,which can be openwith a variety of SQLite clients available for all platforms,will show information such
as address book contacts, call history, SMS and e-mail messages, etc. This includes the consolidated.db file, which in
some iOS 4.x versions keeps a complete log of the user location forever, which can be parsed by iPhoneTracker [23].
• Property list (.plist) files containing XML information can be viewed with tools available for all platforms. These files
contain other relevant data such as: website bookmarks and cookies, maps history, as well as configuration information
for each application installed.
• Images and videos can be viewed. Moreover, each of them is likely to contain embedded GPS coordinates of the place
where it was taken. This can be very relevant to certain investigations.
• And finally, as a wise forensic examiner once said, ‘when all else fails, we carve’. Raw disk recovery (file carving) tools can
be used to recover any file type based on its signature: pictures, voicememos, raw text. . . This is an extreme resource that
implies getting many corrupt files and disclosing valuable data such as names, paths, and timestamps; however it is still
a very valuable technique, helpful in many scenarios. Open source tools such as Scalpel [24], as well as most commercial
data recovery tools, can be used to extract raw data from the image.
We verified that these and other valuable data can be extracted from an image generated by our method. All these
possibilities are widely covered by Zdziarski [2] and Morrissey [25].
5.2. iOS 4 data encryption
Starting with iOS version 4, Apple introduced a layer of hardware encryption services called data protection [26]. This
feature, if activated, will result in partial encryption of the imaged data. Therefore, it is a very important aspect as far as
forensic image processing is concerned.
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We tested the proposed imaging method on devices with this feature activated and experimented with the encryption
layer, observing a new protect option for the mount command. Under a fresh installation (and subsequent jailbreaking)
of iOS 4.2.1 on an iPad, running the mount command will show that this option is used for the data partition. The same
happens on an iPhone 4. However, on an iPhone 3G (which does not support this feature), the protect option does not
show up.
In addition, we have observed that iOS 4.2.1 /sbin/mount binaries in the iPad and iPhone 4 contain the protect string,
but not in the iPhone 3G binary. The string is also present in several of the /sbin/mount_* binaries under Mac OS X 10.6
Snow Leopard, whereas those same binaries in Linux systems do not contain the ‘protect’ string. This leads us to consider
that, probably, the protect parameter for the mount command refers to the new data protection (local encryption) iOS
feature.
There are two factors that weaken this encryption scheme:
(1) All original iPads sold between March and November 2010 (that is 8–10 million devices) shipped with iOS version 3.x.
Even when undergoing a normal upgrade process to iOS 4.x, encryption will not be activated: for this to happen, the
device must go through a full restoration, which requires completely restoring its data from the iTunes backup. This
takes a notably longer time (one to two hours instead of barely 5–10 min) and will only happen if a fatal error rendered
the device unbootable.
(2) Even if data protection is enabled, it could be circumvented as long as the encryption keys are stored within the device
itself.
In order to determine whether the encryption keys are stored in the device (i.e. the device canmount the encrypted data
automatically, without the need of any user input or network connectivity), we performed the following checks:
(1) The following test was conducted over two devices: a first-generation iPad and an iPhone 4, both of them running iOS
version 4.3.1.
(2) The device was jailbroken and an SSH server installed.
(3) Using the iOS ‘Settings’ app, GSM/3G data connectivity was disabled. In addition, ‘flight mode’ was enabled.
(4) Wi-Fi connectivity was then enabled again. This causes the device to remain in ‘flight mode’ (absolutely no GSM/3G
activity) while allowing for 802.11 wireless communication.
(5) The devicewas connected to aWi-Fi networkwith no Internet connectivity. Other nearby networks stored in the device’s
‘preferred networks’ list were erased, to ensure that upon reboot the device would join our test network.
(6) The device was turned off, and then on, booting normally.
(7) Once the boot process finished, the device would show its lock screen, asking for the passcode. At this point, the device
was left untouched.
(8) From a different computer in the sameWi-Fi network, we initiated a SSH connection to the device, running the ‘mount’
command and confirming that the data partition (/dev/disk0s2s1) was already mounted under /private/var.
The encrypted volume is always automatically mounted with no need for passcode entry or Internet connectivity. This
leads us to the conclusion that iOS 4 local encryption relies on a key stored within the device itself, which implies that
forensic images acquired through our method can be decrypted—even when certain data may be additionally encrypted
with the user passcode, which seems to be the case with the Mail application and others.
In fact, in May 2011, ElcomSoft announced [27] the breaking of iOS 4 encryption, with a smart approximation that
can extract most encryption keys from the physical device, which confirms that the keys reside within the device itself.
However, ElcomSoft restricts the availability of the toolkit to select government entities such as law enforcement and
forensic organizations and intelligence agencies.
5.3. Obtaining relevant information from encrypted images
Even though, to our knowledge, no open and easily available mechanism exists to defeat iOS 4 encryption, our
experiments have shown that, nevertheless, it is possible to obtain some data from our image. Even though encrypted
images initially fail to mount under Mac OS X, we were able to find that, surprisingly, when those images are truncated
(i.e. the filesystem loses its final bytes), they mount correctly. These results persisted in all our tests, in which we shortened
the images by trailing the final bytes (from 1 KB to 1 GB). We did not run further tests because larger cuts would, in the end,
generate problems when reading the images. However, this behavior seems to indicate that the ‘encrypted’ flag resides in a
header at the end of the filesystem and, when this header is missing, OS X does its best to mount the filesystem anyway.
Using thismechanism, the full list of files and directories can be obtained, aswell as other details such as lastmodification
time or file length. The file contents themselves are encrypted, but a lot of useful information about the device usage can
still be obtained this way, such as the list of installed applications or their last usage date.
In many cases, just the existence of files with certain names and sizes can be relevant evidence. For instance, consider a
corporate information leak: if an iOS network client was used to extract the leaked files, or even if just some of the leaked
files have been read in an iOS application, the image will show files with:
• Names, sizes, andm-time (last Modification time) matching those of the original, leaked files.
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Fig. 3. Throughput analysis with different block sizes.
Table 1
Test results: throughput obtained with different block sizes.
bs S1 (MB/s) S2 (MB/s) S3 (MB/s) S (MB/s)
32 KB 20.7 20.8 20.8 20.77
64 KB 20.7 25.1 25.1 23.54
128 KB 29.5 27.6 27.6 28.22
256 KB 28.8 28.8 28.8 28.80
512 KB 28.8 29.5 29.6 29.30
1 MB 29.0 28.9 29.0 28.97
2 MB 28.1 28.1 28.1 28.10
4 MB 22.9 22.9 23.0 22.93
8 MB 18.1 18.1 18.2 18.13
16 MB 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.30
32 MB 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.50
• c-time (Creation time, or time of the last status Change), indicating when the files first arrived on this device (or, if they
were moved to a different directory afterwards, indicating when that happened).
• a-time (last Access time), indicating when the files were last read, which can indicate whether the files have been
manually reviewed by the user after downloading them.
• Their allocation under the folder of the corresponding iOS application that generated them.
6. Performance analysis
The most important parameter in the efficiency of our proposed method, as far as imaging speed is concerned, is the bs
(block size). In order to obtain an optimal value,we ran a series of tests for each value. External interferencewasminimized by
turning off Bluetooth, 3G data, push notifications, push e-mail, and localization services. Wireless connectivity was needed
for our tests, however our wireless network did not have a gateway to the Internet, again to keep the device activity to a
minimum. After these settings were applied, the device was rebooted into a clean state.
Under these conditions we ran three complete 63.5 GB dumps for 11 different values for bs, amounting to a total of
1.90 terabytes in 33 dumps. The speed obtained in each test (S1, S2, S3) can be seen in detail in the corresponding Table 1 (see
Fig. 3 for a quick summary).
We were surprised to find that small values (128 KB–2 MB) provide the best throughput, whereas larger or smaller
values result in a notable speed decrease. This is in contrast to what happens with traditional computers (be they desktops
or laptops), in which the best results are obtained with block sizes of 16 or 32MB, usually matching typical hard drive cache
sizes.
In comparison, we tested the Zdziarski method over an ad-hoc 802.11n network operating at its maximum theoretical
rate (108 Mbps), and we obtained a throughput of barely 1 MB/s, which means that a 16 GB iPad would be imaged in 5 h
and a 64 GB one would require about 20 h. Our USB approach results in a speed boost of nearly 30× over traditional Wi-Fi
imaging.
Forensics software vendors do not seem to release specifications about the imaging times needed by their methods; we
could only find that information for Jonathan Zdziarski, who states [28] ‘‘the latest version of the Zdziarski method, which is
used in the automated tools available free to law enforcement agencies worldwide’’: ‘‘about 15–30 min is all it takes, regardless
of whether you’re imaging a 4 GB iPhone or a 32 GB iPhone 3G[s]’’. Assuming he is able to image 32 GB in ‘about 30 min’,
our method is twice as fast. However, Zdziarski does not mention how much time he needs to image an iPad, and our
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method cannot be tested in an iPhone because the iPhone does not support the Camera Connection Kit. Thus, the different
throughputs could also indicate that the iPad’s serial port is faster than that of the iPhone.
7. Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have presented a novel approach that takes advantage of a hidden feature in the iPad’s USB adapter so
it is possible to use a cheap, universally available $ 30 accessory to image the device directly to a USB drive attached to it.
The main contribution of this approach is in providing a mechanism that is fast, open and easily available to anyone, and
that automatically keeps working regardless of the iOS version.
To date, high transfer rates could only be achieved using commercial tools which are paid for and/or restricted to law
enforcement agencies, opaque to the scientific community and undocumented. Therefore, it is difficult to assess what is
really happening during the imaging process and whether the original data is somehow being altered. Furthermore, they
only work for specific iOS versions, which becomes a hassle when the current iOS is upgraded. In fact, it may be the case
that, for some time, no such tool is available.
On the other hand, open and easily upgradeable approaches are entirely based onWi-Fi image transfer, being very slow.
Our approach offers what appears to be the best of both worlds, becoming one of the fastest ways to obtain a complete
forensic dump of the Apple iPad with these characteristics. In fact, we have apparently reached the speed limit of the iPad’s
dock connector. This is accomplished using a generic UNIX approach via jailbreaking, which is likely to last longer thanmost
iPad forensics software products, thus guaranteeing that it can be applied in future iOS versions.
As far as further work is concerned, currently, the main challenge to the whole process of iPad forensic imaging is the
new encryption layer for iOS 4. Even though the device data protect mode is not widespread yet and, since very recently,
law enforcement agencies have methods at their disposal that break such encryption, we deem it interesting to perform an
in-depth study of the iOS 4 encryption system and make further analysis of a protected image.
Nevertheless, there is still some interesting work that does not need a full disk image, such as being able to perform a
live memory dump of the device, autonomous imaging from the iPad to the connected USB drive, eliminating the need for
a network and a remote computer, and analyzing the forensic artifacts left by the AirPrint subsystem in the device’s local
disk.
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